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This paper analyzes the choice of taxes and international information ex-
change by governments in a capital tax competition model. We explain situa-
tions where countries can choose tax rates on tax savings income and exchange
information about the domestic savings of foreigners, implying that the de-
centralized equilibrium is eﬃcient. However, we also identify situations with
adverse welfare properties in which information exchange is compatible with
zero taxes on capital income. The model helps to identify the linkage between
voluntary information exchange and the choice of tax rates. It is shown that
the recent development in information exchange treaties may not be useful to
overcome the ineﬃciencies caused by decentralized tax setting.
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Asymmetric information between national governments about the world-wide capital
income of residents limits the availability of residence-based taxes on capital income.
The sustainability of residence-based taxation, however, is frequently seen as a major
prerequisite to ensure that decentralized tax setting does not cause spillover eﬀects
between tax authorities.1 Residence-based capital taxation can either be implemented
without granting a credit for the foreign tax payments of residents or through a tax
credit system, which avoids the double taxation of income. This paper analyzes the
choice of tax rates and information exchange by ﬁscal authorities in both tax regimes.
Reﬂecting the considerations on spillover eﬀects of decentralized taxation in the
absence of a tax on world wide savings income, it is not surprising that the exchange
of information about the ﬁnancial investment of domestic investors between ﬁscal
authorities is a focus of recent economic debates. Prominent recent examples are
the OECD (2002) initiative and the proposal of the European Commission (2001).
At least the European proposal seems to receive much more support among member
states than previously thought. On the council meeting in January 2003, European
governments have agreed to exchange information with other member states on the
bank details of non-resident investors after almost 13 years of diplomatic wrangling
on the savings tax issue.2 The present paper identiﬁes economic mechanisms that can
explain the existence of these types of ﬁscal coordination, and we analyze whether
countries choose to design such measures to reduce the misallocations resulting from
decentralized decision making.
Any approach to regulation in international taxation must be concerned with ef-
1Seminal papers which address this issue formally are Razin and Sadka (1991) and Bucovetsky
and Wilson (1991).
2The agreement also includes Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg and the large and secretive Swiss
banking market. The agreement will in addition cover oﬀshore centers such as the Channel Islands
and Isle of Man and UK dependencies in the Caribbean. Luxembourg, Austria and Belgium and
Switzerland are allowed to retain banking secrecy in return for imposing a high source tax on non
resident investors using their banking facilities. The tax will initially start at 15 per cent but could
rise to 35 per cent on non resident savings by 2010. Full agreement with other EU states in the
exchange of information is expected by this time, providing Switzerland, which has proved ﬁercely
protective of its banking secrecy arrangements, fully complies with the existing agreement by then.
1fects of international tax agreements on equilibrium in international markets. We can
distinguish two types of approaches, which diﬀer in their perception of a country’s
sovereignty. (i) Sovereignty of countries can assumed to be imperfect in some crucial
aspects by a centralized agency. Given this outside enforcer exists model analysis can
be used to design a supra-country ﬁscal system which helps overcome a Prisoners’
dilemma problem by ensuring cooperation through central intervention. (ii) In con-
trast, the complexities of an approach which takes as given that countries are sovereign
stem from the fact that, for tax agreements to be justiﬁed, economic structures must
be identiﬁed that make regulation an equilibrium policy which is compatible with full
sovereignty. Since we often also observe seemingly unregulated policies, the second
approach entails that countries solve an equilibrium selection problem. The primary
purpose of international (regulatory) agreements is to solve an equilibrium selection
problem, or, in other words, a coordination problem.
The assumption of imperfect sovereignty of countries in tax matters implies that
participation in tax harmonization or in information exchange matters need not to
be voluntary. Here, international organizations are treated as outside enforcement
agencies. This dramatically increases the range of possible policy recommendations
in situations where the taxing problem has a Prisoners’ dilemma structure precisely
because the participation constraint is irrelevant. Whether this approach delivers
valuable conclusions or not depends on the relevant economic environment. The
approach is perhaps less suited if tax agreements between sovereign countries are
analyzed, but it may be well suited to analyze the behavior of jurisdictions or states
within a country in order to discuss tax mechanisms that allow to implement the
eﬃcient allocation (Wildasin, 1989; Ligthart and Keen, 2003). Whether this approach
is reasonable for the analysis of member states in an economic unions foremost depends
on the degree of economic and political integration between the members.
Sovereignty implies that any tax initiative launched in the international policy
arena can only expected to be successfully implemented if it will receive unanimous
support in all countries (Bordignon and Brusco, 2001; Boadway, 2001). In view of
the lack of mechanisms to enforce contracts between countries, any measure of tax
harmonization must be self enforcing. A technique to treat information exchange
agreements as being contained in the set of self enforcing tax strategies is to embed
2the model in a game with repeated interaction as in Huizinga and Nielsen (2003).
The main focus in their paper is on the welfare properties of equilibria in which tax
authorities choose diﬀerent tax strategies dependent on the importance of bank proﬁts
and on the marginal cost of public funds. Bacchetta and Espinosa (1995, 2000) char-
acterize punishment strategies and reciprocity norms that are suﬃcient to guarantee
the exchange of information in a model where ﬁscal authorities cannot diﬀerentiate
between savings and investment. Eggert and Kolmar (2003) use an optimal taxation
framework with a diﬀerentiated set of taxes to characterize tax rates and information
exchange in decentralized equilibria. A main ﬁnding is that competition in tax rates
credibly ties the hands of ﬁscal authorities so that they have no incentive to engage
in information competition. Then, tax and information exchange treaties are self
enforcing.
What is missing in the literature so far is an explanation for the empirical observa-
tion that most countries choose to implement residence-based capital income taxation
by crediting the foreign tax due of residents against the domestic tax. This observa-
tion creates an intellectual puzzle since it is by no means obvious why the potential
transfer of tax revenue to the country of the income’s source should be beneﬁcial for
the country of the investor’s residency. The potential outﬂow of tax revenue could be
avoided by implementing a system of double taxation. Furthermore, it is interesting
to analyze the resulting allocation and welfare eﬀects in the decentralized case when
the choice of the tax system interacts with the strategic use of information exchange.
Accordingly, this paper analyzes the government choice of ﬁscal instruments in two
central scenarios. In the ﬁrst, the authority in each country does not credit the for-
eign tax payments of residents against the domestic tax liability. It turns out in this
scenario that the choice of ﬁscal policy is ineﬃcient because of a Prisoner’s dilemma
problem, even though information exchange is an equilibrium. In the second scenario
it is assumed that ﬁscal authorities have implemented a tax credit system. Then, the
choice of tax rates and information exchange is eﬃcient under the assumption that
household investors have a bias for international investment, which is a plausible sce-
nario in a well integrated economic union. However, there also exists an equilibrium
in the same environment in which countries choose not to provide information and
are worse oﬀ compared to the equilibrium which foresees information exchange. The
3existence of the second equilibrium implies that countries will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
support an institution that coordinates tax policy towards the Pareto eﬃcient equi-
librium with information exchange. If, in contrast, household investors have a home
bias, then the tax problem again has the structure of a Prisoner’s dilemma, even
under the tax credits system. However, the allocation in this case is identical to the
allocation that is obtained under a system of double taxation. This is consistent with
the empirical observation that countries choose to implement a tax credit system and
dismiss the alternative, the double taxation of savings income.
The paper proceeds as follows. After introducing the model in section 2, we
examine the outcome of tax competition in scenarios which diﬀer in the domestic
treatment of foreign taxes in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a two-period model of a one shot capital tax competition game between N
countries, federal states or jurisdictions, indexed by i = 1,...,N.3 Each of the iden-
tical jurisdictions is populated by a large number of individuals, and it is assumed
that individuals collectively can coordinate on an equilibrium in which there exists
a regional government or tax authority. The single purpose of this authority is to
provide a local public good. Individuals in state, say, i are physically immobile be-
tween jurisdictions but have access to an international market for portfolio capital.
They may either invest their savings (ﬁnancial capital) at home, si
i, using ﬁnancial
intermediaries at home, or abroad, s
j
i,i  = j, using ﬁnancial intermediaries located
in the foreign countries. Capital market clearing requires that the world return to











where variable ki in (1) denotes real investment of ﬁrms in country i. To exclude any
possibility for ﬁscal authorities to use the system of income taxation to manipulate
the world interest rate R it is assumed throughout the paper that states are small on
3We will use the terms countries, federal states and jurisdictions as synonyms at the outset, but
assign diﬀerent economic environments to these terms later on.
4the capital market in the sense that ﬁscal authorities ignore the eﬀects of their own
policy choices on the world interest rate.
Governments The ﬁscal authority in state, say, i uses a withholding tax on domes-
tic interest income of foreigners, τ
f
i , a source-based tax on domestic real investment,
τs
i , a tax on wage income, τw
i , and a residence-based tax on the overall capital income
of residents, τr
i , or subsets of these taxes, to cover the costs of public good provision.
The residence based capital income tax can take one of two forms, which diﬀer in the
tax treatment of foreign source income. In the ﬁrst case the domestic tax is levied on
the gross foreign source income. In the second case domestic tax authorities credit
foreign tax liabilities against the domestic tax. The availability of the credit is limited
to the domestic tax to retain the jurisdiction to tax savings income at the domestic
rate.
To focus on the taxing problem in the presence of international capital mobility we
assume that states cannot determine the foreign source income of own residents. To
determine the tax due of its own residents under a residence based system of capital
income taxation, state i therefore has to rely on the information that is given by the
foreign tax authorities. We denote by λj ∈ {0,1} the fraction of savings i-residents
invested in state j that state j chooses to report to state i. Taxes are proportional,




i = R[1 − τ
r
i ] net return i-residents obtain from investment in country i,
̺
j
i = R[1 − λjτ
r
i ][1 − τ
f








j )] net return i-residents obtain from investment in country i,
+ R[1 − λj][1 − τ
f
j ] tax credit,
ri = R[1 + τ
s
i ] gross return to physical investment in country i,
ωi = wi[1 − τ
w
i ] wage rate in country i, (2)
where wi is the gross wage, which can be observed by ﬁscal authorities in each state.
5Firms Firms in state, say, i take as given {wi,ri} and rent capital ki and labor li
from individuals to produce a universal consumption good, which we will use as
the numeraire. The technology f(ki,li) has the standard properties of decreasing
marginal returns. Both factors are essential in the sense that limki→0 f(ki,li) = 0
and limli→0 f(ki,li) = 0. Firms maximize proﬁts πi := maxki,li [f(ki,li) − riki − wili].
Using the familiar ﬁrst-order conditions from proﬁt maximization we get the standard
result that inputs should be employed until the marginal product of the last unit is
equal to its rental price. Throughout the analysis we will use a constant returns to
scale assumption which implies that πi = 0 in any equilibrium. While the size of an
individual ﬁrm is indeterminate due to technology, we may use the envelope theorem















a consumption-savings decision in the ﬁrst period and chooses labor supply in the
second. In the ﬁrst period, the individual is endowed with ei units of capital out of
which c1
i ≤ ei − si is consumed, where total savings are either invested domestically
or abroad. Hence, si = si
i + s
j
i using the notation introduced above.4 In the second
period, the individual consumes
c
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where gi is per capita government spending. Utilities u(c1
i,c2
i,li) and ˜ u(gi) are strictly
monotone, concave, and smooth. We assume that the public good is essential in
4To establish a case for taxing capital income we will assume throughout the analysis that ei is
suﬃciently large such that si > 0.
6the sense that limgi→0 ˜ u(gi) = ∞. From the ﬁrst-order conditions follows directly
that individuals do invest at home when ̺i
i < ̺
j




i. In the case of indiﬀerence, we can distinguish two cases which are
equally logically consistent since they are both compatible with the policy choices of
















The ﬁrst case hence characterizes a situation in which individuals prefer to invest
abroad in the case of indiﬀerence. The explanation for a slight preference for outside
investment is exogenous to the model. One interpretation for a slight preference for
foreign investments might stem from convention, resulting from the fact that people
did make bad experiences in the past when they were investing at home.5 Another
explanation might be that residents of each state simply invest in foreign aﬃliates of
domestic banks because these aﬃliates are able to attract customers claiming that
information about the income arising from these transactions is not shared between
states.6 We will henceforth refer to this scenario as foreign bias which is a plausible
















5Expropriation was experienced during the second world war in Austria and Germany. These
countries set down banking secrecy in their constitutions. However, the current policy debate about
international information exchange brings about the fear that banking secrecy rules will become
slack in future.
6The assumption is plausible by casual empiricism. The Deutsche Bundesbank (1994) estimated
that the announcement of a 10% withholding in Germany tax caused a capital outﬂow of 99.5 bill.
DM in 1989. The by far largest part of it was channeled through aﬃliates of German banks located
in Luxembourg. Most savers decided not to return their savings, even though the tax never became
eﬀective.
7Lemma 2 characterizes a situation in which individuals have a preference to invest at
home. The interpretation is that ﬁnancial markets are regulated, or that banks are
unable to eﬀectively compete for customers abroad.
Policy The ﬁscal authority in state, say, i chooses taxes deﬁned in (2) at the be-
ginning of the ﬁrst period (and can credibly commit to this choice within the time
horizon of the model) to ﬁnance per capita government spending gi in the second pe-










i ,wi,R}. Notice that zi does not include {λi,t
f
i } since these variables only
enter the budget restriction of residents in state j. The solution of (4) gives rise to
functions li(zi) > 0, si
i(zi) ≥ 0 and s
j
i(zi) ≥ 0, which may be inserted into the direct
utility function to obtain the indirect utility function
vi(zi,λj,τ
f






















The ﬁscal authority chooses xi to maximize the utility of residents subject to the
market clearing condition for the regional labor markets, the capital market clearing
condition, and the ﬁrst-order conditions of individuals and ﬁrms. From (2) the per
capita revenue correspondence of state, say, i reads as
gi ≤ τ
w
i wili + τ
s











where the variable ϑi captures the development of tax revenues under the two systems
of capital income taxation: (a) in the case of double taxation we deﬁne ϑi := τr
i , and,
(b), under the tax credit system ϑi := max(τr
i − τ
f













j ) s.t. gi ≤ τ
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Since (6) holds with strict equality, we may now use (3) to write welfare in state,
say, i as





































∀τ ∈ xi. (8)
Notice that partial derivatives may characterize discrete responses of tax revenue.










In the following we will ﬁrst discuss a benchmark case which characterizes second
best tax rules. Then we contrast the benchmark tax system with the choice of the
information exchange parameter and tax rates in two diﬀerent tax scenarios. In the
ﬁrst scenario, the ﬁscal authority does not credit foreign tax payments of residents
against the domestic capital income tax. In the second scenario, we assume that such
a tax credit system is in place.
3.1 A benchmark
The assumption that states are small facilitates welfare analysis because it excludes
any motive for states to use tax policy to manipulate the terms of trade. Moreover,
the closed economy case is a reasonable candidate for a point on the utility possibility
frontier that can be achieved by an information exchange agreement since there exists
no motive for interjurisdictional trade in capital in the model apart from diﬀerences
in tax rates. As a consequence, ﬁscal policy in each state should replicate the tax
structure in a closed economy. If the tax structure in an open state does not coincide
with the benchmark, then utility is reduced as a consequence of interstate competition
in tax rates. The tax structure in the benchmark case is:
Result 1 Assume that leisure and ﬁrst-period consumption are Hicksian substi-
tutes. In a closed state a welfare maximizing tax structure is τf ∈ [0,1] and
(ατr + (1 − α)τs)/τw = [wl ∂l
∂̺ − ws ∂l
∂ω]/[Rs ∂s
∂ω − Rl ∂s
∂̺] > 0 where α ∈ [0,1].
9Proof. See the appendix.
Result 1 demonstrates that both wage and capital taxation should be employed
under the assumption that the labor supply and savings function are not backward
bending in the aggregate. Furthermore, notice that result 1 gives multiple equilibria in
taxes. The reason is that the tax bases of τr and τs are identical in a closed economy
since tax bases collapse by the capital market clearing condition. Hence, τs and τr
are perfect substitutes in the sense that the eﬀects of an increase in τs on utility can
be perfectly oﬀset by an equal decrease in τr, and vice versa. Moreover, t
f
i ∈ [0,1]
because the tax base is zero. Any deviation from result 1 indicates that competition
between states introduces an ineﬃciency which would not be present in the absence
of tax competition.
3.2 The open economy under double taxation
The tax system we analyze ﬁrst has the following structure. We continue assuming
that the ﬁscal authority in each state can observe the level of productive capital, ki,
and the ﬁnancial capital that is invested domestically by domestic residents, si
i, and
by non residents, si
j. Residents of state i pay the tax τr
i on their i investment, and the
non-resident tax in state j, τ
f
j , on their foreign source income. There are no credits
given by the home authority for the non-resident tax, hence ϑi = τr
i in (6). In addition,
residents of state i are de jure obliged to pay the tax τr
i on their foreign investment.
However, the foreign investment of domestic individuals is private information in
the absence of inter jurisdictional information exchange agreements. Using the tax
deﬁnitions (2) in lemma 1 and lemma 2 we can summarize the allocation of ﬁnancial
capital in lemma 3:
Lemma 3 In the case of double taxation




i ⇒ si = si
i ∧ s
j
i = 0 2.a τr
i ≤ η
j







i ⇒ si = s
j
i ∧ si
i = 0 2.b τr
i > η
j













10The individual compares the after tax return to capital when making the invest-
ment decision, taking as given foreign and domestic taxes and the information on
the foreign investment of domestic residents that possibly is revealed by the foreign
tax authority. The relevant home tax is τr
i . This tax can take two forms. It is a
residence-based tax on capital income when the tax authority in state j exchanges
information about the j investments of i residents to the tax authority in country i.
It is a source tax on the country i source capital income by i residents when the tax
authority of country j chooses not to exchange information. The interesting impli-
cations are twofold. First, if information is exchanged by the foreign tax authority,
λj = 1, then τr
i vanishes in the arbitrage conditions of individuals from lemma 3.
Second, if information is not exchanged, λj = 0, then i residents compare the tax τr
i
with the source tax on non residents, τ
f
j .
3.2.1 Preference for outward investment
Using lemma 3.1 the possible allocations of savings can be summarized in table 1,
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f
j (i) si = s
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i, sj = si
j (iii) si = s
j
i, sj = s
j
j
˜ gi = λjτr
i Rs
j
i + (1 − λi)τ
f
i Rsi




˜ gj = λiτr
j Rsi














i (1 − λj) < τ
f
j (ii) si = si
i, sj = si
j (iv) si = si
i, sj = s
j
j
˜ gi = (1 − (1 − λj)λi)τr
i Rsi










˜ gj = λiτr
j Rsi
j
Table 1: Allocation of savings and tax revenue under lemma 3.1.
To determine equilibrium tax rates and information exchange assume that infor-






j are positive. First consider case (i) in
table 1 where i-savers invest in state j and j-savers invest in state i. Tax revenues




j ∈ [0,1]. To increase tax revenue from
11withholding taxation state i chooses λi = 0 as long as τr
j ≥ τ
f
i > 0 and the state
is indiﬀerent at τr
j ≥ τ
f
i = 0. By the same argument it is proﬁtable for state j to
choose λj = 0 as long τr
i ≥ τ
f










j = 0 do not




j = 0, however, all τr
i ,τr
j ∈ [0,1] are candidates for an
equilibrium, as the relevant tax base – savings of residents – is zero anyway, and only
λi = λj = 0 do not induce deviations.
In case (ii) and (iii) all savings are invested in one country. Turn ﬁrst to case (ii)
where all savings are invested in country i, and revenue from capital taxation is zero
in state j. Country i sets λi = 0 since tax revenue from withholding taxation would
be zero otherwise. The reason is that j-savers invest in state j if τ
f
i > 0 at λi = 1.




i > 0 to attract i-savers. At
τr
i = 0 such a strategy is not proﬁtable. However, τ
f
j = 0 is incompatible with the




i as long τ
f
i > 0. Hence, if τr
i = τ
f
i = λi = 0 country j is indiﬀerent between
all capital-tax rates and λj. Case (iii) is analogous to case (ii).
In case (iv) all savings are invested in the country where the investor resides.
Hence, tax revenues from withholding taxation are equal to zero. Again it is prof-
itable to reduce information exchange as long τr
j ,τr
i > 0 to increase revenues from
withholding taxation. At λi = λj = 0 state i chooses τ
f
i = τr
j to attract the savings
of j-residents and state j chooses τr
j < τ
f
i . At τr
i = τr
j = 0, however, every positive
withholding tax is compatible with the allocation of savings in case (iv). Moreover,
λi,λj ∈ [0,1] since residents do not invest abroad. Countries cannot eﬀectively tax
capital income even though information exchange is an equilibrium.
Using the envelope theorem in (8), the tax rates for τs
i and τw











































































where βi is the marginal utility of income. Introducing mi := ki−si = −li∂wi/∂ri−si















It is clear from (11) that the small state will not use the source tax on the domestic
capital, τs
i = 0. We may now summarize results.
Result 2 In the case of a preference for outward investment and double taxation
equilibria can be characterized as follows. (1) Tax revenues from capital taxation are
always equal to zero. (2) Either the residence-tax will not be levied and the withholding
tax on capital income are arbitrary, the withholding tax-rates are equal to zero and the
residence-tax rates are arbitrary, or one country chooses not to levy any of both taxes
and the other country chooses both taxes at arbitrary rates. (3) Information exchange
is an equilibrium if the residence-tax rate equals zero. (4) Countries use wage taxation
to ﬁnance the public good according to (10a).
Result 2 demonstrates that states are unable to raise revenue from capital taxation
in equilibrium. The argument is twofold. First, the source tax on the physical invest-
ment by ﬁrms is not levied in equilibrium because such a tax would reduce production
and wages. The former distortion can be avoided by taxing wages directly. Hence,
states choose not to levy the source tax on physical capital and tax wage income to
avoid the loss in production eﬃciency. Second, states might abstain from taxing the
domestic-source capital income of residents residing abroad on a source basis because
any positive tax would drive out savings. The positive withholding-tax rate exactly
paves the way for information exchange because the residence tax-rate is zero anyway.
3.2.2 Home bias
The next scenario to consider in this section is the environment where savers have a
preference for investment in their residence country. The table 2 shows the allocations
of savings and tax revenue under lemma 3.2. To determine the equilibrium tax rates
and information exchange we assume that all taxes are positive and that information
is exchanged. In case (i) states have an incentive not to provide information in order
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Table 2: Allocation of savings and tax revenue under lemma 3.2.
positive. Hence, all investors go abroad. If, say, τ
f




to attract j-residents. If τ
f
i = 0, however, then such an incentive does not exist as the
eﬀect on tax revenue is absent. Every positive residence based tax is compatible with
the allocation in case (i), which, however, does not become eﬀective since investors
do not invest in the country where they reside. This makes information exchange an
equilibrium.
In case (ii) and (iii) all savings are invested in one country. Turn ﬁrst to case (ii)
where i-residents invest in state i and j-residents invest in state i if λi = 0, which is a




i . At τr
i = 0 such a policy is not proﬁtable. Moreover, state j can increase
tax revenue by setting 0 < τr
j < τ
f
i to attract j-savers as long τ
f
i > 0. Hence, τ
f
i = 0
does not induce deviations. However, τr
j = 0 is not in accordance with the assumption
that all savings are invested in country i. Hence, if τr
i = τ
f
i = λi = 0 country j
is indiﬀerent between all capital-tax rates and information exchange. Case (iii) is
symmetric to case (ii).
Turn to case (iv) where all investors invest in the residence state and, thus, tax
revenues from withholding taxation are zero. To increase tax revenue from withhold-
ing taxation states will choose not to provide information as long τr
i > τ
f








i-residents reallocate their savings to increase revenue from withholding taxation. If
14τr
i = 0 such a strategy is impossible and a proﬁtable deviation does not exist. On the
other hand, if τ
f
i > 0, it is impossible to gain for country j by lowering τr
j as the tax
base – s
j
j – is already subject to residence taxation or τr







j ∈ [0,1] are compatible with case (iv).
The rates τw
i and τs
i are given by (10), from which follows that τs
i = 0 from (11).
We summarize with:
Result 3 Result 2 is also valid in the case of incomplete capital market integration
and double taxation.
The result suggests that information will be voluntarily exchanged under this
section’s assumptions on the prevailing tax system. However, positive tax rates on
capital income and information exchange are mutually exclusive in equilibrium, and
the argument is again twofold. First, wage taxation does dominate the source tax
on physical investment as a consequence of the production eﬃciency lemma. Second,
states compete for the domestically invested ﬁnancial capital of own residents under
lemma 3.2, whereas they compete for the ﬁnancial capital invested abroad in the
previous case under lemma 3.1. In the present case, any positive source tax on the
savings income of own residents creates an incentive to undercut in the competing
state. When the domestic source tax on own residents is zero such an incentive is ab-
sent and all savings are invested where the individual resides. This makes information
exchange an equilibrium. Result 3 hence is similar to result 2, albeit the proofs and
their economic explanations diﬀer. This diﬀerence will become even more important
when we analyze the tax credit system in the next section.
The arguments given under results 2-3 make intuitive that the decentralized equi-
librium has inferior welfare properties compared to the benchmark case since:
Result 4 A system of information exchange will not increase utility if states choose
not to use the residence-based capital income tax in equilibrium.
Proof. We prove the result by contradiction. Assuming that information is ex-


























15where the envelope theorem has been used. We form −R(mi + li∂wi/∂ri)∂Li/∂τw
i −
liwi∂Li/∂τr



















which is identical to the tax structure in result 1.
3.3 The open economy under tax credits
The second tax system that we analyze has a more complicated structure. Here,
foreign tax payments are credited against the domestic capital tax as long the foreign
capital tax does not exceed the domestic. Hence, ϑi = max(τr
i − τ
f
j ,0) in (6). Using
the tax deﬁnitions (2) in lemma 1 and lemma 2 allows to summarize the investment
decisions by the individual as follows:
Lemma 4 In the case of tax credits
lemma 1 implies lemma 2 implies
1.a τr
i < ˜ η
j
i ⇒ si = si
i ∧ s
j
i = 0 2.a τr
i ≤ ˜ η
j





i ≥ ˜ η
j
i ⇒ si = s
j
i ∧ si
i = 0 2.b τr
i > ˜ η
j






i := λj max(τr
i ,τ
f
j ) + (1 − λj)τ
f
j .
Parts 1 of lemma 4 show that the individual will not reallocate ﬁnancial capital under
the credit system as long the tax on residents in country i is not strictly smaller than
the foreign source tax for all values of the information exchange parameter λj. Parts 2
of lemma 4 show that the individual will not reallocate savings as long the residence-
based tax is not strictly larger than the foreign source tax at λj = 0. Whereas
the assumptions on the savings function with respect to a home or foreign bias did
not play a crucial role for the results in the preceding section that equilibrium tax
revenue is zero under double taxation, the following results are able to demonstrate
that this role is crucial when a tax credit system is in place. Let us ﬁrst turn to the
case of complete capital market integration where parts 1 of lemma 4 apply. One
would expect that the ﬁscal authority in state i does not have any incentives to share
information at all in this case since j-residents invest in state i as long the eﬀective
16tax on savings income in state j is weakly larger than the tax in state i. However, we
obtain the opposite result.
3.3.1 Preference for outward investment
We use table 3 to demonstrate that the tax credit system eliminates any adverse
incentives.
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Table 3: Allocation of savings and tax revenue under lemma 4.1.
Interestingly, table 3 shows that the allocation of savings does not depend on
the information exchange parameter λ. To explain the result observe that the tax
credit system avoids the double taxation of savings income as long the credit limit is
not surpassed. If it is surpassed, then i-residents invest in state i for all λj anyway.
Hence, if state j sets τ
f
j > τr
i i-residents always invest in state i and information
exchange is costless for state j. On the other hand, if τ
f
j ≤ τr
i and information is not
exchanged by state j, λj = 0, then i-residents invest in state j, and they also do so at
λj = 1 because of the credit system. The argument makes intuitive that information
exchange is without costs from the perspective of each state, hence λi,λj ∈ {0,1}.
This gives rise to the following result:
Result 5 When savers have a preference for outward investment and the tax credits
system applies there exists an equilibrium in which all states provide information,
λi = λj = 1. However, there also exists an equilibrium where ﬁscal authorities choose
not to provide information, λi = λj = 0.
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i . Cases (i) and (ii) are not candidates for an equilibrium since
symmetric incentives are not compatible with the assumption that all savings are
in just one country. In case (iv) all savings are invested where the investor resides.
State i can increase tax revenue by choosing τ
f
i = τr




This choice, however, is not compatible with the assumption that all savings are
invested in the state of residence. Hence, states choose the level of wage taxation and
source based taxation of investment by ﬁrms according to (10). The residence tax on
ﬁnancial capital is set such that (12) are fulﬁlled. Hence, ts
i = 0 from (11) and the
ratio τr
i /τw
i follows (13). We summarize with:
Result 6 Assume that savers have a preference for outward investment and lemma 1
applies. When information is exchanged the tax structure in the decentralized equilib-
rium is compatible to the tax structure in the benchmark of result 1.
The intuition for the result is as follows. First notice that each state has an incentive




j . At λj = 0 i-residents simply take advantage of the fact that the domestic
tax is lower and invest at home. At λj = 1 the tax τr
i becomes a residence-based
tax and any τ
f
j > τr
i will cause i-residents to invest at home because of the credit
limit. For the same reason λi is irrelevant for country j at τr
j < τ
f




j . Start assuming that λj = 0, then τr
i becomes a source tax. This directly
implies that residents invest abroad. At λj = 1 the foreign tax will always be credited
by the domestic tax authorities, so residents invest abroad. The discussion reveals
that countries compete in source taxes in the equilibrium where information is not
exchanged, akin to the argument provided for result 2. Hence:
Result 7 Assume that savers have a preference for outward investment and lemma 1
applies. When information is not exchanged, then capital taxation does not raise tax
revenue. The public good is ﬁnanced using wage taxation only according to (10a).
A combined eﬀort in all states to make capital income taxation sustainable would
increase welfare.
We may now summarize the main ﬁndings of this section. Results 2–5 shows that
there exists equilibria in which countries choose to exchange information in the model,
18next to an equilibrium where those incentives are absent. The consequences of infor-
mation exchange in result 6 are, however, diﬀerent to the equilibria with information
exchange in results 2–4 and 7. In contrast to the latter, result 6 describes a scenario
in which countries can raise tax revenue from capital income taxation.
3.3.2 Home bias
Let us now contrast the case described above with the results in an environment
where the capital market is segmented. The assumption is that the borders of those
segments fall short to the geographical borders. Surprisingly, incomplete capital mar-
ket integration does eliminate any incentives for governments to raise revenue from
capital income taxation. Observe that lemma 4.2 implies that we have to consider
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Table 4: Allocation of savings and tax revenue under lemma 4.2.
Observing that table 4 reproduces table 2 we can state the following:
Result 8 Result 2 is also valid in the case of a home bias and under the tax credit
system.
A discussion of result 5 and result 8 clariﬁes the mechanism which makes informa-
tion exchange an equilibrium in this model. When capital markets are not segmented
then individuals will make use of the option to choose the ﬁnancial intermediary which
oﬀers the most preferable service. The bank is most likely not located in the home
19jurisdiction, provided that the overall number of jurisdictions is suﬃciently large. We
interpreted this situation as an environment where lemma 1 applies. Voluntary infor-
mation exchange is an equilibrium in this environment exactly because individuals do
not reallocate their savings when the source tax on capital income in the jurisdiction
where the ﬁnancial capital is invested is equal to the tax levied in the jurisdiction
where the individual resides. In contrast, the underlying assumption in result 8 is
that the geographical borders of a jurisdiction collapse with the boundaries of the
segments on the capital markets. In this case the government in each jurisdiction has
an incentive to lower the tax burden placed on ﬁnancial capital below the tax burden
in other jurisdictions. The crediting of taxes only assures that the eﬀective tax bur-
dens are equalized between jurisdictions. The conﬂict between result 5 and result 8 is
then understood from the observation that the tax credit system eliminates the incen-
tives of individuals to reallocate their ﬁnancial capital to the home jurisdiction only
in the case where the capital market is fully integrated. However, ﬁscal authorities
have an incentive to strategically use information exchange in an environment where
the equalization of the tax burden immediately causes capital to move to the home
state.
3.4 Discussion of model extensions
A core result of the previous discussion is that information exchange turns out to be an
equilibrium in the present model. However, information exchange is only a necessary
condition for the eﬃciency of decentralized tax setting. Hence, it is interesting to
discuss model extensions and mechanisms that help to ensure eﬃcient decision making
by states.
First, let us discuss whether the results qualitatively depend on the assumption
that wage taxation can be optimally set by states. Consider the example where the
wage tax is bounded from above such that τw
i = 0 in all states. The vector of tax
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where βi is the marginal utility of income. We form ∂Li/∂τr
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The small state chooses to use the source tax on real investment by ﬁrms when
the wage tax is not available since 0 < τs
i /τr
i < ∞ from (15).7 Of course, as is
indicated by the term (∂wi/∂ri)2 the absence of wage taxation causes a loss in utility
compared to the case where such a tax is available. However, the loss is due to
domestic imperfections and it is not caused by the mobility of capital. Also note
that τs
i does not enter the arbitrage condition of individuals and, hence, does not
aﬀect the allocation of ﬁnancial capital. Therefore we can conclude that none of the
results in the previous sections changes fundamentally when the domestic tax system
is imperfect in the sense that wage income cannot be taxed. The only diﬀerence is
that the source tax on investment by ﬁrms is not zero in equilibrium and some tax
revenue can be raised by capital taxation. But this has not eﬀect for the incentives
of states to exchange information.
So, if a zero bound on source taxation of real investment and the availability of
wage taxation is not crucial for the model results, which model extension straight-
forwardly changes results in a relevant way? An important starting point for this
discussion is to assume that states restrict their use of the source tax on the ﬁnancial
investment by non residents if the state receives information about the foreign capi-
tal income of own residents. If, however, information is not provided then the state
‘punishes’ the other state by implementing an source tax on the capital income by
foreigners. Under this modiﬁcation, cases (i) in tables 1–4 reduce to
7We maintain the assumption that leisure and ﬁrst period consumption are Hicksian substitutes.
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Inspection of the cases taken from tables 1, 2 and 3 shows that country i has no in-
centive to use λi strategically when country j provides information. State i exchanges
information and taxes the capital income of own residents according to the residence
principle. Since all states act accordingly, decentralized tax setting is eﬃcient.
However, the state has an incentive to use information exchange and tax policy
strategically in the case where the other state chooses not to exchange information.
Then, the logic described in results 1–4 and 8 applies, leading to the result that either
taxes on capital income are equal to zero or the tax base is zero. Decentralized tax
setting is ineﬃcient here since tax revenue from residence taxation of ﬁnancial capital
is always zero.8 To sum up, states are still tempted to attract world savings using
information exchange and τf strategically to increase the public budget — but a
supranational authority can help to support the Pareto eﬃcient benchmark as the
outcome with decentralized tax setting if it were to dictate a zero tax on the domestic
source income of foreign investors.
4 Conclusions
In this model we set up a tax competition model where jurisdictions are able to
compete for mobile capital, assuming that ﬁscal authorities simultaneously choose
information exchange and taxes on ﬁnancial and real capital. We demonstrated that
information exchange is an equilibrium in this game. However, information exchange
turned out to be only a necessary condition for an eﬀective level of savings taxation.
The exception is the scenario where savers have a preference for outward investment
and each country grants credits for the foreign taxes paid by domestic residents. In
all other scenarios there exists equilibria in which countries exchange information but
nevertheless are unable to raise revenue from capital income taxation. It follows from
8The case from table 3 is repeated here for completeness only since it is obvious that there exists
an eﬃcient equilibrium from result 6.
22this argument that countries may choose to credit the foreign tax due of residents
against the domestic tax liabilities.
Our results can be interpreted in at least two diﬀerent ways. The starting point of
the ﬁrst interpretation is the perception that international institutions like the OECD
and the EU Commission are not outside enforcement agencies and, consequently, can-
not act against the best interest of member states. The model rationalizes outcomes
where countries choose to exchange information because of the absence of a positive
residence tax on savings. In this case decentralized tax setting cannot implement the
eﬃcient outcome. This is what we called the information exchange puzzle in the title
of the paper. The puzzle has an interesting empirical implication. Any attempt of
the EU or OECD to introduce a system of information exchange has to be judged by
the willingness of states to choose a positive tax on savings income of residents. The
present model suggests that there exist equilibria in the real world where taxes on
worldwide savings income are zero when information is exchanged.
The starting point of the second interpretation of the model results is the per-
ception that international institutions are outside enforcement agencies. In this view,
participation of states need not be voluntary, or participation is obvious and need not
to be explained within the model. The implementation of regulatory policy measures
in the economic environments in which decentralized decision making causes a waste
of resources are of special importance in such a ‘dictatorial’ regime. Of course there
are many instruments a supra jurisdictional authority may use to give governments
the necessary incentives to provide information. But one is straightforward from the
present analysis. The tax measure which seems to be most compatible with the princi-
ple of subsidiarity — as it appears in The Treaty on European Union and The Treaty
of Amsterdam — is to dictate a zero source tax on ﬁnancial capital to eliminate tax
base eﬀects. This would leave the decision about other tax rates and information
exchange at the regional level. States would still be able to set the remaining taxes
according to their speciﬁc needs. The present model analysis suggests that they would
implement residence based taxation of capital income. There are arguments for the
view that the action proposed by the EU council directive goes beyond what is nec-
essary to achieve the objective of ensuring a minimum of eﬀective taxation of savings
income.
23Appendix
Proof of result 1
Proof. We characterize the closed economy case where N = 1, which allows to
skip country-speciﬁc indices. In a closed economy k = s and ˜ R := R|N=1 must adjust
appropriately in any equilibrium. First notice that tax revenue of τf is zero in a closed
economy because the tax base is zero. Hence, τf ∈ [0,1]. Second, the tax base of the
residence-based capital tax can perfectly be monitored by the government. Third, the
tax bases of the source-based capital tax τs and the residence-based capital tax τr
collapse. Hence we can set τs = 0 without loss of generality, implying that ˜ R = r from
the deﬁnition of τs. Moreover, the tax problem is bounded from the assumption that
all taxes are in [0,1]. Clearly, tw = tr = 0 cannot be a welfare maximum under the
assumption that the public good is essential. The case tw = tr = 1 can be excluded
since households would neither save nor supply labor, implying that second period
production is zero. Cases tw = 1,tr ∈ [0,1] and tr = 1,tw ∈ [0,1] can be excluded
from the assumption that both factors of production are essential in production. We
consider the case where (8) for τr and τw is equal to zero, and the resulting tax rates
characterize the welfare maximum. Using the Envelope theorem on the indirect utility
function, the conditions for an optimal choice of taxes are:
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where β is the marginal utility of income. The derivatives ∂ ˜ R/∂τr and ∂ ˜ R/∂τw are
obtained by using s = k = −∂w/∂r, where the latter equality is a consequence from

























24where we assume that J ≷ 0. Take a pair {τr,τw} such that ∂L/∂τr|N=1 = 0 and
∂L/∂τw|N=1 = 0. We then know – since ∂v/∂̺  = 0 and ∂v/∂ω  = 0 – that
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and, by the same token,
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˜ Rtr (τ
r − 1)w + ˜ R
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∂ω
´ (A.2)
since the ﬁrst line in (A.1) is equal to l2 ∂2w
∂r2 > 0. Using the Slutsky equation, it can
be seen from the condition for the tax rates (A.2) above that the rates of both taxes
{τr,τw} are positive under the assumption that the cross-price derivatives of compen-
sated factor supply functions are negative, i.e. when leisure is a Hicksian substitute
with ﬁrst-period consumption.
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